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How Does Ownership Influence Business Growth?  
A Competitive Dynamics Perspective 
 
Abstract 
Firms engage in competitive actions to gain market share and hence to grow their 
revenues. However, not all firms are equally able to use competitive actions to drive 
growth. We argue that the ability to translate competitive actions to revenue growth 
depends on the ownership of the firm. Drawing on principal-agent and principal-
principal perspectives, we argue that: (1) private owners (both foreign and local) are 
better able to employ aggressive actions to grow their business than state owners; (2) 
firms with multiple owners (especially international joint ventures) are less able to 
implement actions that drive business growth than full ownership. We find support for 
these arguments in empirical tests on survey-based data of 106 firms in China. Results 
show that in an emerging market the principal-principal perspective can better explain 
governance and competition than the principal-agent perspective. 
Keywords: Competitive dynamics, principal-agent conflict, principal-principal 
conflict, ownership type, business growth  
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1. Introduction 
Extensive evidence suggests that ownership is a key driver of firm performance 
(e.g., Boubakri et al., 2016; Fitza & Tihanyi, 2017; Zou & Adams, 2008). For 
example, Dougherty, Herd, and He (2007) find that Chinese private firms and wholly 
foreign owned enterprises (WFOEs) have markedly higher overall productivity than 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Recently, Xia and Walker (2015) find that ownership 
type explains 6.78% of interregional variation in firm performance, and 4.11% in 
interindustry variation. In contrast, firm effects explain 28.2% of interregional 
variation in performance and 32.4% of interindustry variation. This suggests that in 
addition to ownership type (direct effect), firm effects are key to explaining 
performance. Yet it remains unclear how ownership interacts with firm factors in 
shaping performance.  
We address this question by investigating firm-level strategies as drivers of firm 
performance. Specifically, we analyze a critical firm-specific factor – competitive 
action – which concerns the rivalry behavior between competitors (Chen, Smith, & 
Grimm, 1992). The competitive dynamics perspective suggests that firms engage in 
competitive actions to impose or respond to external competitive pressure. Recent 
studies confirm that competitive action aggressiveness (a firm’s engaged activities to 
challenge rivals directly and intensely in order to maintain or improve its market 
position) is a key driver of firm growth (Chen, Lin, & Michel, 2010; D’Aveni, 
Dagnino, & Smith, 2010; Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier, 2001; Nadkarni, Chen, & Chen, 
2016; Yu, Subramaniam, & Cannella, 2009). We advance this line of theorizing by 
arguing that ownership type plays an important role in the effectiveness of action 
aggressiveness in driving business growth. 
The corporate governance literature provides rich explanations as to why 
ownership type matters. Traditionally, this literature focused on principal-agent (PA) 
conflicts, which concern discrepancies in the interests of shareholders (as principals) 
and managers (as agents) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Recent studies emphasize 
principal-principal (PP) conflicts as a particular concern of firms in emerging markets 
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due to concentrated ownership, institutional weaknesses, and the special role of the 
SOEs (Li & Qian, 2013; Young, et al., 2008). The PP perspective concerns the 
discrepancies of interests between different principals, which further complicate firm 
decision making. 
However, how PP and PA conflicts influence competition in emerging markets has 
rarely been studied. Thus, we have limited knowledge on how ownership type (i.e., 
state, local private, foreign, or international joint venture) shapes governance conflicts 
and thereby influences firm competition and performance. The PA and PP 
perspectives have common theoretical roots, but highlight different constraints on 
managerial decision making and hence firms’ ability to design competitive actions. 
Based on the two perspectives, we derive alternative hypotheses, and find that the PP 
perspective can better explain outcomes of strategic actions. By comparing PA and PP 
perspectives, we can further our understanding of the governance and competition of 
firms in an emerging market.  
This research offers four contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
international business (IB) literature by furthering our understanding of why foreign 
entrants can outperform some but not all types of domestic firms. The IB literature 
has often compared strategy and performance of foreign and domestic firms (e.g., 
Hutzschenreuter & Grone, 2009; Xia & Liu, 2017). Adding to this literature, we not 
only examine the competitive interaction between domestic and foreign firms, but 
also conduct more nuanced analysis. Our finer distinction of ownership types (i.e., 
state versus non-state, partial versus full, and domestic versus foreign ownership) 
offers clearer insights to explain firms’ competitive actions and effectiveness in 
emerging markets than the simple domestic-foreign distinction. 
Second, to the literature on ownership and performance (Boubakri et al., 2016; 
Xia & Walker, 2015), we add fresh insights on how an important firm specific factor, 
competitive action aggressiveness, influences business growth in firms of different 
ownership type. As one of the first studies, we investigate the interaction of ownership 
and competitive action, thus responding to calls for more research on the relationship 
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of ownership, competitive actions, and firm outcomes (Mascarenhas, 1989; Wright et 
al., 2005). The investigation of ownership types provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of the drives and motivations of firm behavior. 
Third, prior research on governance largely focuses on principal-agent conflicts 
while neglecting the diverse interests and potential conflicts between different 
principals. Yet, in emerging economies, principal-principal conflicts are often 
paramount (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Young et al., 2008). We propose 
that difference of interests between different types of owners leads to difference in 
firms’ competitive actions. We thus contrast PA and PP perspectives to explain the 
impact of ownership types on firm competitive behavior. 
Fourth, research on competitive dynamics has mostly focused on the external 
competitive pressures on firms’ competitive actions and advantage (Chen, 1996; Chen 
et al., 2010). By introducing ownership as an explanatory variable, we integrate 
external and internal aspects to examine the outcomes of competitive actions, thereby 
expanding the theoretical lens of competitive dynamics research. This consideration 
of ownership types makes competitive dynamics research more relevant to emerging 
economies (Yang & Meyer, 2015). Thereby, we add an important theoretical 
perspective to the flourishing empirical research on the growth of firms in emerging 
economies (Kumar, Mudambi, & Gray, 2013; Kumaraswamy, Mudambi, & Tripahy, 
2012; Meyer & Tran, 2006; Singh & Delios, 2017). 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 Competitive aggressiveness 
Competitive dynamics research focuses on the competitive interaction between 
rivals (Chen, 1996; Smith et al., 1991). By actively engaging in competitive moves, 
firms gain competitive advantages (Smith et al., 1991). In particular, the speed of 
decisions improves firm performance because it allows early adoption of new 
products, processes and business models (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 
1989). For example, Judge and Miller (1991) find that decision-making speed 
improves firm performance especially in high-velocity industries such as 
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biotechnology. Baum and Wally (2003) find that environmental dynamism moderates 
the impact of decision speed on financial performance.  
However, competitive dynamics research suggests that fast decisions need to be 
translated to effective competitive actions in the market. Aggressive actions, defined 
as firms’ quick and frequent moves against rivals, can strengthen a firm’s market and 
financial positions, and thereby lay the foundations for business growth (Chen et al., 
2010; Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999). Thus, firm’s propensity 
to undertake aggressive actions depends, among other factors, on executive 
characteristics such as executive’s time horizons (Nadkarni et al., 2016).  
However, competitive dynamics research has largely analyzed firms as 
homogeneous organizations (Sirmon, Grove, & Hitt, 2008). This downplays the fact 
that firms differ in their objectives and the resources they control and can deploy in 
competitive action (Chang & Xu, 2008; Sirmon et al., 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). In 
particular, competitive dynamics research “has not sufficiently explored the 
competitive interaction among firms with diverse organizational forms” (Vroom & 
Gimeno, 2007, p. 901). To fill this gap, we examine firm ownership type as a 
moderator of the performance impact of competitive actions.  
2.2 Principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts 
Motivations of managers to engage more or less aggressively in competitive 
action are influenced by the ownership and governance of the firm. The corporate 
governance literature emphasizes PA conflicts arising from divergent interests of a 
principal (an owner) and an agent (a manager), which need to be resolved through the 
design of incentive and monitoring systems (Boivie et al., 2016; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016). Emerging market firms face severe PA conflicts 
due to lack of such systems, often allowing managers to make decisions that serve 
their self interest rather than the interests of the firm. For example, Douma, George, & 
Kabir (2006) argue that due to underdeveloped corporate control, managerial labor 
markets and product markets, managers in Indian companies are left unaccountable 
for their performance. 
6 
 
On the other hand, Young et al. (2008) argue that PP conflicts are more salient in 
emerging markets due to concentrated ownership and weak institutional protection of 
minority shareholders. Formal laws and regulations tend to be vague or weakly 
enforced in areas such as information disclosure and securities trading. Often, firms 
have to rely on informal institutions such as relational ties, business groups and 
government contacts to manage governance issues (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Peng, 
2003; Singh & Delios, 2017; Xu & Meyer, 2013).  
Weak formal institutions in particular drive owners to internalize potential risks 
by increasing their shareholding (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Hence, firms in emerging 
markets (such as China and Russia) use concentrated ownership and other informal 
mechanisms to fill corporate governance vacuums (Lins, 2003; Puffer & McCarthy, 
2003; Young, et al., 2008). However, concentrated ownership creates problems of 
expropriation of minority owners by majority owners, the typical PP conflict 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Li & Qian, 2013; Young et al., 2008). With limited 
shareholder protection, concentrated ownership allows majority owners to expropriate 
minority owners, for example, by appointing relatives to key positions in the firm 
(Backman, 1999), by buying supplies at above-market prices or selling goods at 
below-market prices from related firms (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001), or by engaging in 
strategies that advance personal, family, or political agendas at the expense of firm 
performance (Li & Qian, 2013; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005). 
These PA and PP conflicts influence how managers take competitive actions. 
Specifically, firms in different types of ownership are likely to experience these 
conflicts to varying degrees (see Table 1), which influences the effectiveness of 
competitive actions managers take. Both PA and PP conflicts can lead to inefficient 
strategies with less restructuring (Claessens et al., 2002; Filatotchev et al., 2003) and 
less investment in innovation (He & Wang, 2009; Morck, et al., 2005).  
In a similar vein, the joint venture (JV) literature is concerned about PP conflicts 
between different JV partners (as owners), due to their likely goal incongruence and 
conflicts of interest, and about PA conflicts between the JV partners and JV managers 
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as their agents (Hennart, 1988; Klijn & Reuer, 2015). For instance, JV managers may 
make decisions without close monitoring of the owners due to geographical and 
cultural distance – a PA conflict.  
In some jurisdictions, the majority owner of a JV may be entitled to take key 
strategic decisions without obtaining consent of other owners, yet in other countries 
minority shareholders with equity stake above a certain threshold have de jure or de 
facto veto rights, which means a consensus needs to be reached before an action is 
taken. Moreover, under weak formal institutions, local JV partners may have other 
means to undermine majority owners’ decisions that conflict with their interests – a 
common PP conflict in emerging economies (Das & Teng, 2003; Westman & 
Thorgren, 2016).  
Thus, majority ownership does not normally give sole decision rights, and 
effective strategy implementation in JVs requires broad shareholder agreement and 
commitment (Goodall & Warner, 2002). Finding a consensus, however, not only 
slows down the decision making process but may require compromises that serve the 
interest of the parents rather than the JV per se. This need for consensus potentially 
undermines the aggressiveness and effectiveness of competitive actions. 
2.3 Ownership and governance costs 
Managerial motivations also vary across firms with different types of owners, in 
particular between state and private ownership. Theoretical considerations suggest 
that private ownership is superior to state ownership in maximizing productive 
efficiency when firms operate in competitive markets (e.g., Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). 
While private firms tend to have well-defined corporate goals such as profit and 
shareholder wealth maximization, SOEs usually pursue a broader and less clearly 
defined set of objectives, including preservation of declining industries, employment, 
subsidization of consumption, and buttressing national security (Aharoni, 1986). 
Moreover, the politicization of decisions may open state firms to lobbying and 
unproductive rent seeking (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Governmental objectives can 
change from one political leader to the next, which limits the ability of business 
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leaders in SOEs to make credible long-term commitments (Megginson & Netter, 
2001). In addition, a broader range and more transparent incentive and monitoring 
systems are available for private firms (Cole, Berkman, & Fu, 2010; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
The advantages of private ownership have been shown in numerous empirical 
studies of privatization (see Estrin et al., 2009; Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; Megginson & 
Netter, 2001 for reviews). In particular, many studies find that privatization, combined 
with institutional reforms that secure effective governance, enhances firm profitability 
(e.g., Boubakri et al., 2016; Djankov & Murrell, 2002), revenue growth (e.g., Sun & 
Tong, 2003), and internationalization (Estrin et al., 2016). 
2.4. Putting the elements together 
The PA and PP perspectives enable us to investigate how ownership influences 
how well firms can translate competitive actions to business growth. We distinguish 
four categories of firms – local SOE, local private firm, WFOE, and international joint 
ventures (IJV). Local SOEs have a state entity as their main owner, whereas local 
private firms have a private individual or organization as main owner. WFOEs refer to 
firms fully owned by a foreign investor. JVs refer to independent legal entities that are 
owned by two or more (domestic and international) partners. We focus on IJVs, i.e., 
partnerships between local and foreign investors because, compared to domestic JVs, 
IJVs often manifest higher levels of PP conflicts, which is the theoretical construct of 
interest in this study. 
Table 1 summarizes the PA and PP conflicts typically arising in firms of different 
types of ownership. PA conflicts concern the unaligned interest between managers and 
owners, whereas PP conflicts concern discrepancies between such as majority and 
minority owners, state and non-state owners, or domestic and foreign partners. For 
example, in SOEs, top managers may pursue personal wealth at the expense of the 
interest of shareholders, which may be a government agency with limited monitoring 
capabilities (a PA problem). Moreover, SOEs may involve various state and non-state 
shareholders whose motivations and goals differ (a PP problem). Next, we compare 
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firms across different ownership types to discuss how various PA and PP conflicts 
affect firms’ competitive actions and firm growth. 
*** Insert Table 1 here ***  
3. Hypothesis development 
Competitive dynamics research focuses on the competitive interaction between 
rivals (Chen, 1996). Firms undertake competitive actions to respond to rivals and to 
change their competitive posture (Smith et al., 1991). Under intense competition, 
firms survive and prosper by taking quick and frequent moves that exploit temporary 
advantages (D’Aveni, 1994). A firm that reacts faster to changes in the marketplace is 
more likely to defend its market positions and to capture new business opportunities 
(Chen et al., 2010).  
Especially in volatile markets, such as emerging economies, actions may have to 
be adjusted frequently because of new events in the market, including competitors’ 
actions or external changes in technologies or government interventions. Firms may 
gain competitive advantages if they can ‘just decide’ yet maintain organizational 
flexibility to quickly readjust when a suboptimal decision is made (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Mosakowski, 1997). Especially in markets that appear to move at random, fast 
decisions and implementation of actions may yield valuable organizational learning 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Mosakowski, 1997), and in turn enable business growth. 
Thus, aggressive actions – more actions (action frequency) and faster actions 
(action speed) – help firms to strengthen their market position vis-à-vis rivals, which 
is key to success in direct competition (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Derfus et al., 2008). 
Empirical evidence supports these theoretical arguments as aggressive actions are 
associated with higher market share gains (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 
1999) and profitability (Chen et al., 2010; Ferrier et al., 2002; Nadkarni et al., 2016).  
However, not all performance measures can be enhanced at the same time – 
actions that enhance favorable outcomes on one performance dimension may have 
unfavorable impact on another dimension (Richard, Devinney, & Yip, 2009). For 
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example, product innovations may enable a firm to rapidly gain market share, but 
because of the costs of R&D, they may harm short-run profitability. In this study, we 
are primarily concerned about business growth, which, as argued above, is associated 
with aggressive actions related to new products and markets. Hence, our base line 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1. Action aggressiveness is positively related to firms’ revenue growth.  
Variations across ownership types 
From the PP perspective, SOEs are governed by multiple state agencies, which 
often have a variety of non-financial interests. State agencies may prioritize objectives 
such as sustain local employment or clean up a local river that complicate and delay 
SOE managers’ decision making and negatively impact financial performance. 
Moreover, under vaguely defined goals and soft budget constraint, SOEs are often 
neither driven to use resources efficiently (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; Kornai, 1986), nor 
to make swift moves to adjust to the competitive environment (Li & Qian, 2013), or 
to take forceful actions that accelerate growth (Claessens et al., 2002; Filatotchev et 
al., 2003). 
In contrast to SOEs, private firms have more congruent goals for firm growth, 
and accordingly managers are more incentivized to pursue growth-oriented strategies 
(Sun & Tong, 2003). Cull and Xu (2005) find that private firms in China are 
commonly owned by individuals with family support who are strongly oriented 
toward profit and reinvestment in the firm. Due to resource constraints, private firms 
have to continually assess whether their allocation of resources is effective. Further 
input of resources is likely to be incremental and based on feedback of prior resources 
on performance, rather than long-term projections (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
Incremental actions based on short feedback loops enable firms to adjust to 
environmental changes and new conditions (Bradley et al., 2011). Private firms’ 
ability to re-direct resources to new opportunities (such as new markets) enhances 
their likelihood of survival and superior performance in dynamic emerging markets 
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(Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010; March, 1995). In summary, various interests of owners 
inhibit SOEs from translating aggressive actions into firm growth, whereas aligned 
financial interests of owners in private firms encourage firms to compete aggressively 
to grow the business. 
From the PA perspective, SOEs have a closed and hierarchical labor market 
relying on tenure and political connections (Chang & Wong, 2004). In particular, most 
senior managers are promoted within the state sector with moves between SOEs, 
government and party roles (Brødsgaard, 2011). As SOEs may be stepping stones for 
managers’ career progression (Fan et al., 2017), long-term growth of the firm is not 
critical for their promotion. Rather, they are likely to emphasize the development of 
personal networks and undertake symbolic actions that generate attention and signal 
support for higher-level political objectives. For example, an SOE manager may 
initiate green energy products when “green” agenda is high on the political agenda. 
But s/he may have moved on to the next job by the time the new products reach the 
market. Thus, SOE managers, in the interest of career progression, are likely to 
prioritize ‘symbolic’ actions which deviate from the interests of financial shareholders 
(Fan et al., 2017; Li & Qian, 2013).  
Moreover, from the PA perspective, SOE managers tend to be more risk averse as 
their career is at stake if they fail whereas their private gains are minimal if they 
succeed (Andrews & Dowling, 1998), which leads to less restructuring and innovation 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000). In other words, SOEs likely engage in less risk-taking or 
aggressive actions to advance firm growth due to managers’ lack of incentives to do 
so (Tan, Luo, & Shenkar, 2005; Zou & Adams, 2008). 
In contrast, goals of private firms are mainly financial, which are straightforward, 
and managerial behavior in such firms is relatively easy to monitor and incentivize. 
Managers with careers linked to the external labor market may be more likely to 
engage in competitive actions that enhance firm performance than those whose career 
is related to the government, as better financial performance sends stronger signals to 
the labor market than to the government (Li & Qian, 2013). 
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Thus, both PP and PP perspectives suggest that due to lack of PP and PA conflicts 
in local private firms, managers have more incentives to engage in competitive 
actions to grow the firm than managers in SOEs. We propose: 
Hypothesis 2a. The positive relationship between action aggressiveness and revenue 
growth is stronger for local private firms than for local SOEs. 
Embedded in MNEs, WFOEs operating in emerging markets have a single 
shareholder with unified goals,1 and are regulated, to a certain extent, by their home-
country institutional environment (Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 2007). They 
typically have rich experience, technologies and knowledge to engage with 
competitors in a local market (Bartlett & Goshal, 1989). This, together with their 
financial focus and absence of PP conflicts, enables WFOEs to design competitive 
actions that are more effective at enhancing performance than SOEs. In other words, 
the PP perspective suggests that WFOEs can better translate competitive actions to 
firm growth than local SOEs. 
From a PA perspective, however, the conflicts between headquarters and 
managers of overseas subsidiaries are likely to be more substantial than conflicts in 
local firms because foreign headquarters cannot monitor subsidiary managers in detail 
(Gaur & Lu, 2007). Headquarters of WFOEs are often geographically and culturally 
distant from the subsidiary, which makes it difficult for them to evaluate and monitor 
subsidiary managers even if suitable incentive mechanisms are in place, especially in 
changing, uncertain situations (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Lawler et al., 2011). 
Therefore, subsidiary managers may pursue personal goals that are at discrepancy 
with the interests of headquarters (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015).  
Similarly, local SOEs may encounter misaligned interests between managers and 
shareholders. For example, Puffer & McCarthy (2003) report abuses by SOE 
managers to shareholder interests in the transition of Russian firms, which included 
                                                             
1 The parent firm may in turn have multiple owners, and hence be subject to PP conflicts, but we 
consider it rare that such PP conflicts would directly affect a WFOE. 
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setting up personally owned shadow companies to funnel funds, not announcing 
shareholder meetings, and deleting names from shareholder registers. Thus, both 
WFOEs and local SOEs may encounter severe PA conflicts. However, we argue that 
due to geographical and cultural proximity and incentive alignment for the SOE 
managers, SOEs may experience lower levels of PA conflict than WFOEs, which 
leads SOE managers to engage in competitive actions that are more effective in 
growing the firm. 
Thus, the PP and PA perspectives offer different implications for the effectiveness 
of competitive actions. The PP perspective, which emphasizes conflicts between 
different shareholders, suggests greater problems in the cases of SOEs compared to 
WFOEs, which in turn leads us to expect less effective actions to be taken by SOEs. 
On the other hand, the PA perspective suggests that managers in WFOEs may lack 
incentives to pursue competitive actions that push firm growth than SOE managers. 
Therefore, we propose alternative hypotheses, aiming to determine which perspective 
can better explain the relationship: 
Hypothesis 2b. The positive relationship between action aggressiveness and revenue 
growth is stronger for WFOEs than for local SOEs.  
Hypothesis 2b (Alternative). The positive relationship between action aggressiveness and 
revenue growth is weaker for WFOEs than for local SOEs. 
IJVs are established to achieve certain strategic goals of the IJV partners. 
However, goals of the partners can be different or even conflicting (Filatotchev & 
Wright, 2011; Hennart, 1988). For example, one IJV partner may prioritize 
profitability, while the other partner may want to enter new markets that do not offer 
short-term contributions to profitability. As another example, one IJV partner may 
supply key components to the IJV. By selling goods at above-market prices, the 
partner benefits at the expense of the other partner. Such goal incongruence is 
compounded by cultural differences between IJV parents, and makes IJVs more 
challenging to manage than firms under full ownership, especially in weak 
14 
 
institutional environments (Fey & Beamish, 2000; Kogut & Singh, 1988). The 
conflict of interest and the need for consensus typically slow down decision making. 
Moreover, compromises between the IJV parents may primarily serve the interest of 
the parents rather than the IJV per se. Thus, diverging interests between partners, as 
emphasizes by the PP perspective, are likely to reduce not only the aggressiveness of 
IJVs’ competitive actions but also the effectiveness of actions eventually taken.  
The top management of IJVs is typically appointed by one of the IJV parents, and 
hence their loyalties are primarily with that parent rather than with the IJV as such. 
Therefore, they may lack incentives and resources to engage in aggressive 
competitive actions such as frequently launching new products (Bamford & Ernst, 
2005; Chang & Xu, 2008; Klijn & Reuer, 2015). Goal incongruence among the 
parents would inhibit effective strategy design and implementation by IJV top 
managers (Klijn & Reuer, 2015; Li & Qian, 2013). Moreover, a high risk of mis-
appropriation by IJV partners may further distract IJV top manager’s energy from 
engaging in market competition (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Thus, IJV top managers 
likely guard the parent’s interest by adopting more conservative competitive behaviors 
such as focusing on existing geographic markets and avoiding direct challenges to 
competitors. 
The PA perspective suggests that IJV top managers may employ self-interested 
behavior exploiting the partners’ goal incongruence and/or unaligned performance 
criteria that make the assessment of IJV top management more difficult (Dalton et al., 
2007). For example, Yang (2011) finds that managerial compensation and career do 
not directly link to the performance of Chinese-foreign JVs, which aggravates agency 
problems. The lack of effective performance evaluation and incentive alignment limits 
IJV top managers’ focus on revenue growth through aggressive actions. Compared 
with IJVs, local private firms can better align shareholder and shareholder-manager 
interests, and hence incentivize their managers to take aggressive actions that actually 
promote firm growth. Thus, both PP and PA perspectives suggest that: 
Hypothesis 2c. The positive relationship between action aggressiveness and revenue 
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growth is stronger for local private firms than for IJVs. 
As discussed, WFOEs do not normally have PP conflicts due to single ownership, 
while their financial focus induces managers to take aggressive actions that grow the 
firm. In contrast, IJVs face severe PP conflicts between the IJV parents, which limit 
IJVs’ effectiveness in translating aggressive actions to growth. 
From a PA perspective, however, the relationship is more complex. On the one 
hand, compared with IJVs, WFOEs can provide ample resources and managerial 
incentives (including career opportunities), and WFOE managers have more 
autonomy in making decisions such as entering new markets, while IJV managers 
need to consult multiple parents and their managers (Vroom & Gimeno, 2007; Wei, 
Xie, & Zhang, 2005). On the other hand, the inability of the headquarters to directly 
monitor subsidiary managers abroad leaves room for managers to shirk. IJVs 
encounter double agency challenges – an IJV partner not only needs to monitor 
behavior of its own-designated managers but also partner-designated managers. 
Overall, we argue that at least one of the IJV parents is in proximity with the IJV, so it 
can better monitor IJV managers than MNE headquarters do to its foreign subsidiary. 
Moreover, the IJV manager designated from one parent may also discipline the other 
parent-designated manager’s behavior. Thus, IJV managers are more motivated to 
compete aggressively to grow the firm than WFOE managers. 
In summary, we propose alternative hypotheses to test whether the PP or PA 
perspective can better explain the effectiveness of WFOEs and IJVs in translating 
aggressive actions to growth. 
Hypothesis 2d. The positive relationship between action aggressiveness and revenue 
growth is stronger for WFOEs than for IJVs. 
Hypothesis 2d (Alternative). The positive relationship between action aggressiveness and 
revenue growth is weaker for WFOEs than for IJVs. 
4. Methodology 
4.1  The research setting: China 
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Testing our hypotheses requires a field of intensive competition between diverse 
types of firms under imperfect institutions. China meets these conditions as intensive 
competition is taking place in this volatile environment (Chen, 2009). Specifically, the 
huge size of the Chinese market has two effects on business. First, it creates 
opportunities for a large number of firms to co-exist as they can target different 
market segments. Second, the existence of a large number of incumbents makes 
within- and cross-segment competition more intense as firms try to exploit 
opportunities across various business spheres (Qiu et al., 2009; Williamson & Zeng, 
2009). The competitors vary in their ownership and organizational forms, providing 
the variety of ownership types needed to test our hypotheses. Due to relatively low 
technological requirements and low entry barriers, local firms often compete on a 
low-cost, low-price basis, further intensifying the competition in many industries 
(Chang & Park, 2012). In this intense competition involving many players, active and 
aggressive actions can be critical to supersede rivals. 
We constructed our sample by deliberately selecting industries with many 
competitors, hence avoiding industries with oligopolistic and monopolistic market 
structures where regulatory fiat may become the dominant driver of firm performance. 
These criteria secured that there was potential for intense competition between many 
players in the market. Prior studies find that action aggressiveness is more strongly 
associated with superior performance in fast-changing, hypercompetitive industries 
than in slow-changing industries (Chen et al., 2010; Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010; 
Nadkarni et al., 2016). Based on these criteria, we selected the following industries: 
beauty and personal care, food and beverages, machinery, medical devices, consumer 
appliances, computers, automotive, transport and telecommunications, and retail. 
With the representation from manufacturing and services industries, good industry 
variation was achieved.  
4.2 Sample and data collection 
Prior research on competitive dynamics mostly uses archival data on competitive 
actions, e.g., structured content analysis (Chen & Miller, 2015). However, potentially 
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available texts for content analysis vary in their detail of reporting on different types 
of firms, especially foreign versus local firms and public versus non-public firms, 
which would create biases related to our focal explanatory variable, action 
aggressiveness. Hence, we conducted a survey of top managers to collect primary 
data. This unique survey enabled us to capture the relative aggressiveness of 
competitive actions (Chen et al., 2007) by asking the respondents to assess their 
company vis-à-vis the major rivals. 
Since responses to mail surveys are typically low in China (Li & Miller, 2006), 
we approached firms via course participants and alumni of CEIBS, China’s leading 
business school with the largest Executive MBA and Executive Education programs 
in Asia Pacific with more than 10,000 alumni. The respondents were senior managers 
who were decision-makers of the firms under investigation. We reached these subjects 
in 2012 through both an online and offline survey. The combination of multiple 
methods was to ensure a reasonable response rate and a broad representation of 
sample companies. 
We first developed the questionnaire in English. Two independent translators (one 
of them being an author of this study) translated it into Chinese. The translators 
discussed each inconsistence until they reached an agreement. Prior to the survey, we 
conducted a pilot test to confirm the face and construct validity of the items of the 
questionnaire with 10 senior and middle-level managers. Based on their feedback, we 
improved the design and wording of the items. 
We sent the survey to senior managers of 2,620 firms, whom we addressed with a 
personalized cover letter that promised a complimentary summary of the results. To 
minimize biases in the response pattern, we allowed respondents not to disclose their 
name, and instructed them to answer the questions relying on an immediate 
impression after reading the questions rather than thorough analyzing. We sent two 
rounds follow-up reminders every two weeks and followed up by phone calls. We 
compared earlier and later responses on each variable and did not find significant 
differences. We also compared responding and non-responding firms on firm size, age 
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and ownership type using the t-tests and found all t-statistics to be non-significant. 
We received completed questionnaires from 426 firms. After excluding missing 
values and unsuitable firm responses, we obtained 297 usable observations. We then 
collected secondary data on firm performance from the CVSource2 database for a 
sub-sample of 106 firms that matched the survey data to form our research sample.  
Among the 106 respondents, 42 held CEO, president or chairman positions and 
64 held other senior management positions of Vice President, Chief Finance Officer 
(CFO), Chief Operation Officer (COO), board member, or founder. The average work 
experience of those not in CEO, president or chairman roles was more than 10 years, 
which indicates that they were credible respondents with ample knowledge of the 
firm. Of the 106 firms, 53.8 percent were Chinese private firms, 18.9 percent were 
SOEs, 18.9 percent were WFOEs, and 8.5 percent were IJVs. 84.9 percent had more 
than 500 employees. The sample provides a cross-section of businesses in China, with 
a good representation of medium to large firms. As prior studies have shown that 
larger firms are more likely to engage in active competitive behavior (Audia & Greve, 
2006; Chen et al., 2007), our construction of the sample with larger firms is 
appropriate. 
4.3 Dependent variable 
Revenue growth is a key organizational objective that is associated with higher 
profits (Keiningham & Aksoy, 2007). However, engaging in aggressive actions may 
require firms to employ significant resources, which, in the short run, could 
negatively affect profitability. Thus, we deem revenue growth to be a good indicator 
of financial performance for this research. We assessed revenue growth by the focal 
firm’s year-to-year change in revenues (as a ratio) as from 2010 to 2011 and from 
                                                             
2 CVSource is an online database system which is owned by Imedix, Inc. It provides professional 
information and data solutions, including equity investment trends, industry research, and company 
analysis. Access to the database requires a subscription. Prior studies have used this database to study 
topics such as M&As and venture capital. 
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2011 to 2012.3 As aggressive actions may have a longer-term effect on performance, 
as well to control for temporal fluctuations (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), we used 
the average of revenue growth of 2011 and 2012. This measure was calculated using 
data from the CV Source database. With an archival source for our dependent 
variable, we circumvent concerns regarding common method variance, which has 
become a major concern in questionnaire-based research.  
Moreover, as revenue growth can take both positive and negative values, we 
transformed it using the inverse hyperbolic sine function (IHS) (Burbidge, Magee, & 
Robb, 1988). IHS transformation is superior to the traditional logarithmic 
transformation as the IHS transformation accommodates negative values and 
improves the normality of the data by down-weighting extreme values (Burbidge et 
al., 1988; Nyberg et al., 2010). This transformation is represented computationally by 
the equation:  
sinh -1 (x) = log [x + (x2 + 1) 1/2] 
4.4 Independent variables 
Following Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm (1999), we asked the respondents to 
aggregate each type of firm action of the given year (2011) to enable us to conduct the 
analysis on a firm-year level of analysis. This is appropriate because firms may pursue 
a set of interconnected actions several times over a certain period. Our dependent 
variable, action aggressiveness, has been derived from a previously validated 
questionnaire instrument by Chen, Lin, and Michel (2010). Accordingly, action 
aggressiveness is composed of two major properties of competitive action – action 
speed and action frequency – for each of three types of actions including introducing 
new product, introducing new service, and market entry or market expansion (see 
Appendix A). Action frequency captures the number of actions initiated by a firm, and 
action speed captures the speed of actions the firm takes in a given year (Andrevski, 
                                                             
3 Revenue growth of 2011 = (revenue of 2011 – revenue of 2010) / revenue of 2010; Revenue growth 
of 2012 = (revenue of 2012 – revenue of 2011) / revenue of 2011. 
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Brass, & Ferrier, 2016; Chen et al., 2010; Derfus et al., 2008; Nadkarni et al., 2016; 
Yu & Cannella, 2007). In other words, action aggressiveness is reflected by the more 
actions and a higher speed of taking these actions (Chen et al., 2010). Responses were 
obtained from a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “far slower than competitor”, 7 = “far faster 
than competitor”) for each type of actions. The correlation coefficient between action 
speed and action frequency is 0.79.4 
The factor analysis of these six items using varimax rotation generated a single 
factor for action aggressiveness, suggesting a very close association between action 
speed and action frequency in our empirical field. See the factor loadings in Appendix 
A. 
Our moderation variable is ownership type, which we obtained from the survey. 
Respondents classified their firm in one of four types. Local SOE takes the value of 1 
if the firm was Chinese state owned (i.e., the government was the main shareholder), 
local private takes the value of 1 if the firm was a Chinese private firm (i.e., a private 
individual or organization(s) was the main shareholder), WFOE takes the value of 1 if 
the firm was wholly foreign owned (i.e., 100 percent of the equity was owned by a 
foreign firm), and IJV takes the value of 1 if the firm was an IJV between (at least) 
one local and one foreign parent firms. We ran additional robustness tests using 
alternative categorizations (see below). 
4.5 Control variables 
We included firm-level control variables suggested in the literature. We measured 
firm age by the natural logarithm of number of years from establishment to the year 
2012. Firm size was measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total number of 
employees in 2011. Industry was controlled using the OECD industry scheme, 
including five categories: low-tech manufacturing, medium-low tech manufacturing, 
medium-high manufacturing, high-tech manufacturing, and services. 
                                                             
4 This is similar to Chen et al.’s (2010) finding that their correlation coefficient is 0.84. 
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Mascarenhas (1989) argues that given publicly traded firms’ financial resources 
and their owners’ and managers’ desires for stable growth in earnings, they may 
develop broader product lines that offer opportunities for growth than non-public 
firms. Hence, we also controlled public listing. We used a dummy variable to measure 
public listing, with 1 for firms listed in a Chinese stock market or in a foreign stock 
market or both by 2011; otherwise, 0 for non-listed firms. Also, firms’ actions may 
differ in the way they take actions depending on their export orientation. We 
measured export orientation by asking the respondent the extent to which the 
company’s total output was exported (1 = “0-5%”, 2 = “6-25%”, 3 = “26-50%”, 4 = 
“51-100%”). 
We also used two variables to control for the market environment: market growth 
and competitive intensity. We measured market growth with a three-item scale 
adapted from Zhou and Wu (2010) that measures how fast the firm’s business activity 
has been growing. Responses were obtained on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly 
disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”). Competitive intensity was measured by assessing the 
severity of competition in the local market using a four-item scale from Atuahene-
Gima and Ko (2001). Responses were obtained on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
“strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”).  
4.6 Psychometric properties of measurement scales 
We examined the correlations between all variables (see Table 2), and obtained 
variance inflation factors (VIF). Both checks confirm that multi-collinearity is not a 
substantive problem. . The composite reliabilities of all survey-generated constructs 
range from 0.75 to 0.86 (see Appendix A). 
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
5. Results 
*** Insert Table 3 about here *** 
Table 3 displays the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. 
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Model 1 is the baseline model. In Models 2, 4, and 6, we introduce our explanatory 
variable, action aggressiveness, though with different ownership types as base. 
Models 3, 5, and 7 report the interaction effects. In Models 2, 4, and 6, we find that 
action aggressiveness has a positive and highly significant effect on the revenue 
growth (b = 0.486, p = 0.001). This is consistent with our baseline Hypothesis 1.  
The remainder of the hypotheses proposes that ownership type moderates the 
relationship between action aggressiveness and revenue growth. To test these 
hypotheses, we add the interactions of competitive actions with ownership types in 
Models 3, 5, and 7. Hypothesis 2a proposes that aggressive actions have a stronger 
positive effect in local private firms than in SOEs. Models 3 and 5 show positive and 
significant results for the interaction term and action aggressiveness (b = 0.748, p = 
0.016). Thus, Hypothesis 2a is supported, suggesting that local private firms 
experience a stronger link between action aggressiveness and growth than SOEs. 
Hypothesis 2b proposes that aggressive actions have a stronger positive effect in 
WFOEs than in SOEs, while Hypothesis 2b (Alternative) proposes the opposite: 
WFOEs perform worse than SOEs when taking aggressive actions. Models 3 and 7 
show positive and significant results for the interaction term and action 
aggressiveness (b = 1.007, p = 0.021). Thus, Hypothesis 2b is supported, suggesting 
that WFOEs experience a stronger link between action aggressiveness and growth 
than SOEs. This result suggests that the PP perspective can better explain the 
interaction effect: as WFOEs do not experience PP conflicts whereas SOEs 
experience a high level of PP conflicts, WFOEs can enhance the effectiveness of 
transferring actions into growth than SOEs. 
In Hypothesis 2c, we proposed that aggressive actions have a stronger positive 
effect in local private firms than IJVs. Model 5 shows significant results for the 
interaction term and action aggressiveness (b = -1.868, p = 0.041) (the reverse sign for 
the regression coefficient is because we use local private firms as base). Thus, 
Hypothesis 2c is supported, suggesting that IJVs experience a weaker link between 
action aggressiveness and performance than local private firms. 
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In Hypothesis 2d, we proposed that aggressive actions have a stronger positive 
effect in WFOEs than in IJVs, and Hypothesis 2d (Alternative) proposes the opposite: 
WFOEs perform worse than IJVs when taking aggressive actions. Model 7 shows 
significant results for the interaction term and action aggressiveness (b = -2.127, p = 
0.025) (the reverse sign for the regression coefficient is because we use WFOEs as 
base). Thus, Hypothesis 2d is supported, suggesting that WFOEs experience a 
stronger link between action aggressiveness and growth than IJVs. This result 
suggests that the PP perspective can better explain the interaction effect: as WFOEs 
do not experience PP conflicts whereas IJVs experience a high level of PP conflicts, 
WFOEs can enhance the effectiveness of transferring actions into growth than IJVs. 
Overall, these findings support our argument that firms in private ownership (local 
and foreign) can better employ aggressive actions to enhance financial performance 
than SOEs. Also, firms in full ownership (local or foreign) can better employ 
aggressive actions to enhance financial performance than partial ownership (IJVs). 
The PP perspective enables us to explain these findings in a straightforward manner: 
due to more severe PP conflicts in SOEs and IJVs, they are less likely to win when 
competing with local private firms or WFOEs whose PP conflicts are lower. 
To illustrate the patterns of the moderating effect of ownership, we present the 
interaction plot in Figure 1 to capture the effects of different ownership types. Figure 
1 shows that the interaction effect is strongest positive in WFOEs followed by private 
firms. For SOEs, the effect is almost flat, and it is negative for IJVs. However our 
empirical tests show that only the difference between the first two (private, WFOE) 
and the latter two (state-owned, IJV) is statistically significant, perhaps in part 
because of the small number of IJVs in our sample. 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
Robustness tests 
Some of our state-owned and private firms are also listed on Chinese stock 
markets (see Table 4), which arguably complicates the ownership structure and thus 
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the incentives for managers to engage in aggressive action. Listed and non-listed 
SOEs have different incentive and monitoring mechanisms, driving firms to employ 
different strategies for growth. Similarly, listed and non-listed private firms may also 
differ in how they engage in competition.  
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
Thus, we did robustness tests splitting ownership types into six categories rather 
than four categories: listed SOEs, non-listed SOEs, listed private firms, non-listed 
private firms, WFOEs, IJVs, and interact them with action aggressiveness. However, 
we do not find statically significant differences in the effects for listed and non-listed 
firms. However, this result is based on a small number of firms in each category, and 
hence further empirical studies into this question are warranted.  
6. Discussion 
Building on recent research on competitive dynamics (Nadkarni et al., 2016; 
Vroom & Gimeno, 2007), we have studied ownership as a contingent influencing the 
relationship between competitive aggressiveness and firm growth. We find that, in 
comparison to SOEs, private ownership (domestic and foreign) is superior in 
translating their competitive aggressiveness to growth. Similarly, full ownership 
(domestic and foreign) is superior in translating competitive aggressiveness to growth 
than partial ownership (IJVs). 
This research offers four contributions addressing limitations in the literature. 
First, to the IB literature, we offer fresh insights on the competitive dynamics between 
foreign and local firms (e.g., Hutzschenreuter & Grone, 2009; Xia & Liu, 2017). 
Specifically, we have suggested that rather than aggregate categories of foreign and 
local firms, using a more fine-grained typology offers more meaningful insights. Our 
findings, summarized in Figure 1, show that IJVs perform worst with respect to the 
effectiveness of competitive actions, though empirically insignificantly different from 
local SOEs. In contrast, WFOEs show the strongest association between actions and 
growth, though insignificantly different from domestic private firms. This has two 
implications for the IB literature. First, it suggests avoiding simplified analytical 
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studies that aggregate all firms with foreign or domestic ownership. Second, it 
confirms the belief among many managers that IJVs are to be avoided unless required 
by specific circumstances. 
Second, prior research has mainly examined the direct effect of ownership on 
performance. However, ownership alone explains only a small part of performance 
variations, while firm factors account for a larger share of the variation in 
performance (Xia & Walker, 2015). We examine an important firm factor, competitive 
action aggressiveness, as it directly influences firm growth. Our study of the 
interaction of ownership and competitive action thus responds to calls for more 
research on the relationship of ownership, firm competitive behavior, and outcomes 
(Mascarenhas, 1989; Wright et al., 2005). As predicted, we find that action 
aggressiveness is indeed positively associated with business growth, but only in local 
private firms and WFOEs. This seems to indicate that competitive dynamic theorizing 
is applicable to private firms without substantive PP conflicts, but the presence of 
substantive PP or PA conflicts may lead managers to take ineffective actions that do 
not benefit firm growth. 
Third, prior research on governance and performance largely focuses on principal-
agent conflicts while neglecting the diverse interests and potential conflicts between 
different principals. We propose that different types of owners have different interests 
with respect to firms’ competitive actions. We contrast PA and PP perspectives to 
explain the impact of ownership types on the outcomes of firms’ competitive 
behavior. We find that the PP perspective can better explain outcomes of competitive 
actions as it provides a relatively straightforward rationale. It suggests superiority of 
private ownership over state ownership, and full ownership over partial ownership in 
translating aggressive actions to growth. On the other hand, the PA perspective offers 
a more sophisticated, multi-facet angle on this theme, which suggests that PA conflicts 
may be ubiquitous across different levels of the organization and hence is not 
conclusive for the relationships we examine.  
By comparing the rationales and testing alternative hypotheses derived from both 
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perspectives, our empirical results suggest that the PP perspective offers a better 
explanation to our theme. Thus, we contend that both theories together provide a 
fuller and richer theoretical explanation to the competition-performance relationship. 
Fourth, we contribute to competitive dynamics research, which previously focused 
on external competitive pressures influencing the impact of strategic actions (Chen, 
1996; Chen et al., 2010). By introducing ownership as an explanatory variable, we are 
able to integrate the external and internal aspects to examine outcomes of competitive 
behavior, thereby expanding the theoretical lens of competitive dynamics research. 
Specifically, our findings of stronger effects for local private firms and WFOEs 
suggest that competitive dynamics theorizing is more relevant for these types of firms, 
but not as relevant for other types of firms. This is an important insight for strategy 
research in emerging economies where both SOEs and IJVs are quite common. Thus, 
we help advance competitive dynamics research to emerging economies, which so far 
has received scant attention from competitive dynamics researchers (Chen & Miller, 
2015; Yang & Meyer, 2015).  
Last but not least, we contribute to the understanding of firm growth in emerging 
economy contexts (Kumaraswamy et al., 2012; Singh & Delios, 2017). While our 
empirical evidence relates to China, we believe that our theoretical arguments 
pertaining to PA and PP perspectives (as illustrated in Table 1) are relevant for other 
emerging markets, where formal governance mechanisms are underdeveloped, 
markets undergo large scale privatization and reform, and foreign investors compete 
head to head with local firms (Singh & Delios, 2017; Xu & Meyer, 2013). Recent 
studies on firms in emerging markets such as India and Vietnam have suggested that 
ownership structure has important underpinnings on firms’ governance, domestic and 
internationalization strategies, and outcomes (Gaur & Delios, 2015; Li et al., 2018; 
Singh & Gaur, 2009). However, there are large variations within emerging markets 
with regard to the role, status and power of SOEs, and hence the magnitude of the 
effects is likely to vary (Estrin et al., 2016; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Singh & Gaur, 
2009). In line with Young and collaborators (2008), we believe that despite these 
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differences, IJVs and SOEs in different emerging economies encounter similar PA and 
PP conflicts, and therefore ownership types would have similar impacts on 
competitive actions and firm growth.  
Limitations in our empirical study suggest avenues for future research. Our study 
focuses on industries where firms face multiple competitors in their product markets. 
This study design is essential to make our analysis relevant to emerging economies, 
yet it limits direct comparability of results with competitive dynamics studies of 
dyadic competition. We propose that future work on competitive dynamics looks 
beyond dyads to examine more competitive actions in complex industry structures. 
We have been privileged to have access to a large pool of senior executives in 
China, specifically the participants and alumni of the EMBA and Executive Education 
programs of CEIBS. The school’s enrollment reflects a broad section of senior leaders 
from a wide spectrum of businesses including private and state-owned firms and 
foreign-invested firms. However, this approach entails the possibility of selection 
biases and oversampling for example more successful firms as they would be more 
likely to send their managers to a leading business school. 
We did not find statistically significant results for IJVs versus SOEs, possibly due 
to the fact that there are few IJVs in our sample. A fuller understanding of the 
challenges faced by IJVs would be of considerable theoretical and practical relevance. 
In order to enhance this understanding, we suggest that future studies may oversample 
IJVs in their study designs.  
Finally, we tested the direct relationship between competitive aggressiveness and 
firm growth. However, our survey data is cross-sectional which does not allow 
examining competitive dynamics over time. Future research can utilize longitudinal 
data by collecting multiple surveys and combining survey data with secondary data to 
examine how competitive actions influence long-term corporate performance.  
7. Conclusion 
The extent of PA and PP conflicts varies across ownership types (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000), and we argue that, in consequence, the effectiveness of firms’ strategic 
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actions in driving growth varies. Specifically, we apply PA and PP perspectives to 
analyze competition of firms in different types of ownership, and find that the PP 
perspective is more consistent with our empirical findings. Ownership type influences 
the agency costs in relation to managers as well as owners, which impact firms’ 
effectiveness in using aggressive actions to grow their business. Overall, our findings 
suggest that private and full ownership are better in translating competitive actions to 
revenue growth than state and partial ownership.   
29 
 
References 
Aharoni, Y. (1986). The evolution and management of state-owned enterprises. Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger. 
Andrevski, G., Brass, D. J., & Ferrier, W. J. (2016). Alliance portfolio configurations and 
competitive action frequency. Journal of Management, 42(4), 811-837. 
Andrews, W. A., & Dowling, M. J. (1998). Explaining performance changes in newly 
privatized firms. Journal of Management Studies, 35(5), 601-617. 
Atuahene-Gima, K., & Ko, A. (2001). An empirical investigation of the effect of market 
orientation and entrepreneurship orientation alignment on product innovation. 
Organization Science, 12(1), 54-74. 
Audia, P. G., & Greve, H. R. (2006). Less likely to fail: Low performance, firm size, and 
factory expansion in the shipbuilding industry. Management Science, 52(1), 83-94. 
Backman, M. (1999). Asian eclipse: Exposing the dark side of business in Asia. John Wiley 
and Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd: Singapore. 
Bamford, J., & Ernst, D. 2005. Governing international joint ventures. McKinsey Quarterly. 
Spring, 63-69. 
Bartlett, C. A., & Goshal, S. (1989). Managing across borders. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Baum, J. R., & Wally, T. (2003). Strategic decision speed and firm performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 24, 1107-1129. 
Boivie, S., Bednar, M. K., Aguilera, R. V., & Andrus, J. L. (2016). Are boards designed to 
fail? The implausibility of effective board monitoring. Academy of Management Annals, 
1-93. 
Boubakri, N., Guedhami, O., Kwok, C. C. Y., & Saffar, W. (2016). National culture and 
privatization: The relationship between collectivism and residual state ownership. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 47, 170-190. 
Bourgeois, L. J., & Eisenhardt, K. (1988). Strategic decision processes in high velocity 
environments: Four cases in the microcomputer industry. Management Science, 34, 816-
835. 
Bradley, S. W., Aldrich, H., Shepherd, D. A., & Wiklund, J. (2011). Resources, environmental 
change, and survival: Asymmetric paths of young independent and subsidiary 
organizations. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 486-509. 
Brødsgaard K.E. (2011). China's communist party and the evolving political order 
In: Charting China's Future: Domestic and International Challenges. Ed. /David 
Shambaugh. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 13-21. 
Burbidge, J. B., Magee, L., & Robb, A. L. (1988). Alternative transformations to handle 
extreme values of the dependent variable. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 83(401), 123-127. 
Chang, E., & Wong, S. (2004). Political control and performance in China’s listed firms. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 32, 616–636.  
Chang, S. J. & Park, S. H. (2012). Winning strategies in China. Long Range Planning, 45, 1-
15. 
Chang, S. J., & Xu, D. (2008). Spillovers and competition among foreign and local firms in 
China. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 495-518. 
30 
 
Chen, M. J. (1996). Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical 
integration. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 100-134. 
Chen, M. J. (2009). Competitive dynamics research: An insider’s odyssey. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management, 26, 5-25. 
Chen, M. J., & Hambrick, D. C. (1995). Speed, stealth, and selective attack: How small firms 
differ from large firms in competitive behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 
453-482. 
Chen, M. J., Lin, H. C., & Michel, J. G. (2010). Navigating in a hypercompetitive 
environment: The roles of action aggressiveness and TMT integration. Strategic 
Management Journal, 31, 1410-1430. 
Chen, M. J., & Miller, D. (2015). Reconceptualizing competitive dynamics: A 
multidimensional framework. Strategic Management Journal, 36(5), 758-775. 
Chen, M. J., Smith, K. G., & Grimm, C. M. (1992). Action characteristics as predictors of 
competitive responses. Management Science, 38(3), 439-455. 
Chen, M. J., Su, K. H., & Tsai, W. (2007). Competitive tension: The awareness-motivation-
capability perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 101-118. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive 
and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2471-2771. 
Cole, R. A., Berkman, H., & Fu, L. J. (2010). Political connections and minority-shareholder 
protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China. Journal of Financial 
and Qualitative Analysis, 45(6), 1391-1417. 
Cull, R., & Xu, L. C. (2005). Institutions, ownership, and finance: The determinants of profit 
reinvestment among Chinese firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 117–146. 
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). The fundamental agency 
problem and its mitigation: Independence, equity, and the market for corporate control. 
Academy of Management Annals, 1, 1-64.  
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2003). Partner analysis and alliance performance. Scandinavia 
Journal of Management, 19, 279-308. 
D’Aveni, R. A. (1994). Hypercompetition: Managing the dynamics of strategic maneuvering. 
Free Press: New York. 
D’Aveni, R. A., Dagnino, G. B. & Smith, K. G. (2010). The age of temporary advantage. 
Strategic Management Journal, 31, 1371-1385. 
Derfus, P. J., Maggitti, P. G., Grimm, C. M., & Smith, K. G. (2008). The red queen effect: 
Competitive actions and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 51(1), 
61-80. 
Dharwadkar, R., George, G., & Brandes, P. (2000). Privatization in emerging economies: An 
agency theory perspective. Academy of Management Review, 25, 650-669. 
Djankov, S., & Murrell, P. (2002). Enterprise restructuring in transition: A quantitative survey. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 40(3), 739-792. 
Dougherty, S., Herd, R., & He, P. (2007). Has a private sector emerged in China’s industry? 
Evidence from a quarter of a million Chinese firms. China Economic Review, 18, 309-
334. 
Douma, S., George, R., & Kabir, R. (2006). Foreign and domestic ownership, business 
groups, and firm performance: Evidence from a large emerging market. Strategic 
31 
 
Management Journal, 27, 637-657. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments. 
Academy of Management Journal, 27, 299-343. 
Estrin, S., Hanoushek, J., Kocenda, E., & Svejnar, J. (2009). The effects of privatization and 
ownership in transition economies. Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 699–728. 
Estrin, S., Meyer, K. E., Nielsen, B. B., & Nielsen, S. T. (2016). Home country institutions 
and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-country analysis, Journal 
of World Business, 51(2), 294-307.  
Estrin, S., & Pelletier, A. 2018. Privatisation in developing countries: What are the lessons of 
recent experience? World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Fan, J. P. H., Huang, J., Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2017). Institutional determinants of vertical 
integration in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 44, 524-539. 
Ferrier, W. J. (2001). Navigating the competitive landscape: The drivers and consequences of 
competitive aggressiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 858-877. 
Ferrier, W. J., Mac Fhionnlaoich, C., Smith, K. G., & Grimm, C. M. (2002). The impact of 
performance distress on aggressive competitive behavior: A reconciliation of conflicting 
views. Managerial and Decision Economics, 23(4-5), 301-316. 
Ferrier, W. J., Smith, K. G., & Grimm, C. M. (1999). The role of competitive action in market 
share erosion and industry dethronement: A study of industry leaders and challengers. 
Academy of Management Journal, 42(4), 372–388. 
Fey, C. F., & Beamish, P. W. (2000). Joint venture conflict: The case of Russian international 
joint ventures. International Business Review, 9, 139-162. 
Fitza, M., & Tihanyi, L. (2017). How much does ownership form matter? Strategic 
Management Journal, 38, 2726-2743. 
Filatotchev, I., & Wright, M. (2011). Agency perspectives on corporate governance of 
multinational enterprises. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 471-486. 
Filatotchev, I., Wright, M., Uhlenbruck, K., Tihanyi, L., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2003). 
Governance, organizational capabilities, and restructuring in transition economies. Journal 
of World Business, 38, 331-347. 
Forsgren, M., Holm, U., & Johanson, J. (2007). Managing the embedded MNC: A business 
network view. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. 
Gaur, A. S., & Delios, A. (2015). International diversification of emerging market firms: The 
role of ownership structure and group affiliation. Management International Review, 55, 
235-253.  
Gaur, A. S., & Lu, J. W. (2007). Ownership strategies and survival of foreign subsidiaries: 
Impacts of institutional distance and experience, Journal of Management, 33(1), 84-
110. 
Goodall, K., & Warner, M. (2002). Corporate governance in Sino-foreign joint ventures in the 
PRC: The view of Chinese directors. Journal of General Management, 27(3), 77-92. 
He, J., & Wang, H. C. 2009. Innovation knowledge assets and economic performance: The 
asymmetric roles of incentives and monitoring. Academy of Management Journal, 
52(5), 919-938. 
Hennart, J.-F. (1988). A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(4), 361-374. 
32 
 
Hermelo, F. D., & Vassolo, R. (2010). Institutional development and hypercompetition in 
emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 31, 1457-1473. 
Hoenen, A. K., & Kostova, T. (2015). Utilizing the broader agency perspective for studying 
headquarters-subsidiary relations in multinational companies. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 46, 104-113. 
Hutzschenreuter, T., & Grone, F. (2009). Product and geographic scope changes of 
multinational enterprises in response to international competition. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 40(7), 1149-1170. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
Judge, W. Q., & Miller, A. (1991). Antecedents and outcomes of decision speed in different 
environmental contexts. Academy of Management Journal, 34, 449-463. 
Keiningham, T. L., & Aksoy, L. (2007). A longitudinal examination of net promoter and firm 
revenue growth. Journal of Marketing, 71(3), 39-51. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (1997). Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging 
markets. Harvard Business Review, 75(4), 41–50. 
Khanna, T., & Rivkin, J. (2001). Estimating the performance effects of business groups in 
emerging markets. Strategic Management Journal, 22(1), 45–74. 
Klijn, E. & Reuer, J. J. (2015). Determinants of CEO duality in international joint ventures. 
Working Paper. September 2015. 
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 19, 411-432. 
Kornai, J. (1986). The soft budget constraint. Kyklos, 39(1), 3-30. 
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. (2002). Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations: Institutional and relational effects. Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(1), 215-233. 
Kumar, V., Mudambi, R., & Gray, S. J. (2013). Internationalization, Innovation and 
Institutions: The 3 I’s underpinning the competitiveness of emerging market firms. 
Journal of International Management, 19(3), 203-6. 
Kumaraswamy, A., Mudambi, S. H., & Tripathy, A. (2012). Catch-up strategies in the Indian 
auto components industry: Domestic firms’ responses to market liberalization. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 43(4), 368-395. 
Lawler, J. J., Chen, S., Wu, P.-C., Bae, J., & Bai, B. (2011). High-performance work systems 
in foreign subsidiaries of American multinationals: An institutional model. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 42, 202-220. 
Li, H., & Miller, T. (2006). New ventures in emerging markets: Comprehensive review and 
future directions. In Growth of new technology ventures in China’s emerging market, Li H 
(ed). Edward Elgar Publishing: Northampton, MA; 11-24. 
Li, J., Meyer, K. E., Zhang, H., & Ding, Y. (2018). Diplomatic and corporate networks: Bridges to 
foreign locations. Journal of International Business Studies, advance online. 
Li, J. T., & Qian, C. L. (2013). Principal-principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study 
of corporate takeovers in China. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 498-508. 
Lins, K. V. (2003). Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 159-184. 
33 
 
March, J. G. (1995). The future, disposable organizations and the rigidities of imagination. 
Organization, 2(3), 427-440. 
Mascarenhas, B. (1989). Domains of state-owned, privately-held and publicly traded firms in 
international competition. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(4), 582–597. 
Megginson, W., & Netter, J. (2001). From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on 
privatization. Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 321–389. 
Meyer, K. E., & Peng, M. W. (2016). Theoretical foundations of emerging economy research. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 47(1), 3-22. 
Meyer, K. E., & Tran, Y. T. T. (2006). Market penetration and acquisition strategies for 
emerging economies. Long Range Planning, 39(2), 177-197. 
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate governance, economic 
entrenchment, and growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 63, 655-720. 
Mosakowski, E. (1997). A resource based perspective on the dynamic strategy-performance 
relationship: An empirical examination of the focus and differentiations strategies in 
entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management, 19, 819-839. 
Nadkarni, S., Chen, C., & Chen, J. (2016). The clock is ticking! Executive temporal depth, 
industry velocity, and competitive aggressiveness. Strategic Management Journal, 37(6), 
1132-1153. 
Nyberg, A. J., Fulmer, I. S., Gerhart, B., & Carpenter, M. A. (2010). Agency theory revisited: 
CEO return and shareholder interest alignment. Academy of Management Journal, 53(5), 
1029-1049. 
Oxley, J. E., & Sampson, R.C. (2004). The scope and governance of international R&D 
alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 25(8/9), 723-749. 
Peng, M. (2003). Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of Management 
Review, 28, 275-296. 
Puffer, S. M., & McCarthy, D. J. (2003). The emergence of corporate governance in Russia. 
Journal of World Business, 38(4), 284-298. 
Richard, P. J., Devinney, T., & Yip, G. (2009). Measuring organizational performance: 
Towards methodological best practice. Journal of Management, 35(3), 718-804. 
Qiu, G., Xu, L., & Sun, X. (2009). Assessment of Chinese companies’ competitiveness. SERI 
Quarterly, July, 40-51. Available at: www.seriworld.rog. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 
52(2), 737-83. 
Sirmon, D. G, Grove, S., & Hitt, M. A. (2008). Resource management in dyadic competitive 
rivalry: The effect of resource bundling and deployment. Academy of Management 
Journal, 51(5), 919-935. 
Singh, D., & Delios, A. (2017). Corporate governance, board networks and growth in 
domestic and international markets: Evidence from India. Journal of World Business, 52, 
615-627. 
Singh, D. A., & Gaur, A. S. (2009). Business group affiliation, firm governance and firm 
performance: Evidence from China and India. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17 (4), 411-425. 
Sirmon, D. G., & Hitt, M. A. (2009). Contingencies within dynamic managerial capabilities: 
Interdependent effects of resource investment and deployment on firm performance. 
34 
 
Strategic Management Journal, 30, 1375-1394. 
Smith, K. G., Grimm, C. M., Gannon, M. J., & Chen, M.-J. (1991). Organizational 
information processing, competitive responses, and performance in the U.S. domestic 
airline industry. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), 60-85. 
Sorenson, O., & Stuart, T. E. (2001). Syndication networks and the spatial distribution of 
venture capital investments. American Journal of Sociology, 106(6), 1546-1588. 
Subramaniam, M., & Youndt, M. A. (2005). The influence of intellectual capital on the types 
of innovative capabilities. Academy of Management Journal, 48(3), 450-463. 
Sun, P., Hu, H. W., & Hillman, A. J. (2016). The dark side of board political capital: Enabling 
blockholder rent appropriation. Academy of Management Journal, 59(2), 1801-1822. 
Sun, Q., & Tong, W. H. S. (2003). China share issue privatization: The extent of its success. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 70(2), 183-222. 
Tan, J., Luo, Y., & Shenkar, O. (2005). Entrepreneurial strategies in a transitional economy: 
Chinese state and non-state enterprises compared and contrasted. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, 5(5/6), 518-538. 
Vroom, G., & Gimeno, J. (2007). Ownership form, managerial incentives, and the intensity of 
rivalry. Academy of Management Journal, 50(4), 901-922. 
Wei, Z., Xie, F., & Zhang, S. (2005). Ownership structure and firm value in China’s privatized 
firms: 1991–2001. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40, 87–108. 
Westman, C., & Thorgren, S. (2016). Partner conflicts in international joint ventures: A 
minority owner perspective. Journal of International Management, 22, 168-185. 
Williamson, P., & Zeng, M. (2009). Value-for-money strategies for recessionary times. 
Harvard Business Review, March, 66-74. 
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I. Hoskisson, R., & Peng, M. W. (2005). Strategy research in 
emerging economies: challenging the conventional wisdom. Journal of Management 
Studies, 42, 1-33. 
Xia, F., & Walker, G. (2015). How much does owner type matter for firm performance? 
Manufacturing firms in China 1998-2007. Strategic Management Journal, 36, 576-585. 
Xia, T., & Liu, X. (2017). Foreign competition, domestic competition and innovation in 
Chinese private high-tech new ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 48(6): 
716-739. 
Xu, D., & Meyer, K. E. (2013). Linking theory and context: Strategy research in emerging 
economies since Wright et al. Journal of Management Studies, 50(7), 1322-1346. 
Yang, W. (2011). Control mechanisms in Sino-German joint ventures: An investigation on 
boards of directors, top management compensation and career development. Aachen, 
Germany: Shaker Verlag. 
Yang, W., & Meyer, K. E. (2015). Competitive dynamics in an emerging economy: 
Competitive pressures, resources, and the speed of action. Journal of Business Research, 
68, 1176-1185. 
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate 
governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. 
Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220. 
Yu, T., & Cannella, A. A. (2007). Rivalry between multinational enterprises: An event history 
approach. Academy of Management Journal, 50(3), 663-684. 
35 
 
Yu, T., Subramaniam, M., & Cannella, A. A. (2009). Rivalry deterrence in international 
markets: Contingencies governing the mutual forbearance hypothesis. Academy of 
Management Journal, 52(1), 127-147. 
Zhou, K. Z., & Wu, F. (2010). Technological capability, strategic flexibility, product 
innovation. Strategic Management Journal, 31, 547-561. 
Zou, H., & Adams, M. B. (2008). Corporate ownership, equity risk and returns in the People’s 
Republic of China. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(7), 1149-1168.  
36 
 
Appendix A. Measures and questionnaire items 
Variables and items SFL 
Action aggressiveness: For each of the strategic actions listed below, has your 
company initiated the action in the last 12 months, and how speedily/how often has 
it been doing that, relative to the major competitor? CR = 0.86 
 
1. Action Speed - Introducing brand new product 0.65 
2. Action Speed - Introducing new service 0.60 
3. Action Speed - Entering new market or market expansion 0.70 
4. Action Frequency - Introducing brand new product 0.66 
5. Action Frequency - Introducing new service 0.68 
6. Action Frequency - Entering new market or market expansion 0.69 
Market growth: To what extent do you agree with the following statements 
regarding market growth of your main business activity in China? (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) CR = 0.80 
 
1. The growth rate of this industry in the past three years was high.  0.64 
2. Market demand in this industry is growing rapidly. 0.91 
3. The many potential customers in this industry provide major opportunities for 
my company. 
0.74 
Competitive intensity: How would you assess the intensity of competition in your 
(Chinese) local market regarding the following aspects? (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) CR = 0.75 
 
1.    Extremely aggressive competition 0.84 
2.    Intense price competition 0.79 
3.    Strong competitor sales, promotion and distribution systems 0.74 
4.    Very similar competitor product offerings 0.59 
CR = construct reliability; SFL = standardized factor loading. 
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Table 1. Principal-principal and principal-agent conflicts for different ownership types 
 Principal-principal (PP) Conflicts Principal-Agent (PA) Conflicts 
Local 
SOEs 
SOEs report to representatives of 
various state agencies with different 
non-financial interests. These goals 
also put the state representatives at 
odds with financial investors in the 
case of listed SOEs. 
Level of conflict: High 
Top managers may pursue personal 
objectives at the expense of firm growth 
and shareholder (e.g., state) interests 
Level of conflict: High 
Local 
private 
firms 
Owners’ interests are aligned with 
respect to the priority of profit-
orientation, but conflicts between 
majority and minority shareholders 
are possible. 
Level of conflict: Moderately Low 
Founder or family-owned firms with 
family members as top managers may 
align ownership with control. Widely 
held private firms are subject to the 
conventional PA problem due to lack of 
effective monitoring mechanisms. 
Level of conflict: Moderately Low 
IJVs Domestic and foreign owners often 
have diverse and conflicting goals. 
Level of conflict: High 
Difficult to monitor and evaluate 
performance of IJV managers, 
especially in a foreign country. Lack of 
control over partner-appointed managers 
gives room for managerial slack. 
Level of conflict: Moderate to High 
WFOEs With a single owner, there is no PP 
conflict between different owners. 
Level of conflict: Low 
Conventional PA conflicts between 
headquarters abroad and subsidiary are 
likely to be more severe than in local 
firms due to the headquarters’ inability 
to manage and monitor managers 
because of cultural and other 
differences. 
Level of conflict: Moderate to High 
 
38 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Firm age (log.) 1.23 0.26                
2 Firm size (log.) 3.38 0.66 .33**               
3 Industry: low-tech manuf. 0.19 0.39 .01 .03              
4 Industry: medium-low tech 
manuf. 
0.10 0.31 -.09 -.12 -.16    
    
     
5 Industry: medium-high tech 
manuf. 
0.45 0.50 .04 -.11 -.44** -.31**   
    
     
6 Industry: high-tech manuf. 0.16 0.37 .05 .09 -.21* -.15 -.40**           
7 Industry: services 0.09 0.29 -.05 .17 -.16 -.11 -.29** -.14          
8 Public listing 0.42 0.50 .16 .47** -.12 -.23* .06 -.01 .31**         
9 Market growth 5.15 1.15 -.02 -.07 .15 -.18 -.04 -.08 .15 -.05        
10 Competitive intensity 5.56 0.94 .12 .12 .00 -.12 -.02 .02 .13 .06 .01       
11 Action aggressiveness 4.86 0.91 .01 .01 .20* -.04 .02 -.14 -.10 -.17 .34** -.09      
12 Ownership: local private 
firm 
0.54 0.50 .05 -.01 .11 -.12 -.07 -.01 .11 .22* .06 .09 .10     
13 Ownership: local SOE 0.19 0.39 .17 .21* -.23* -.09 .14 .05 .09 .32** -.07 .02 -.10 -.52**    
14 Ownership: WFOE 0.19 0.39 -.13 -.03 .14 .23 -.15 -.01 -.16 -.41** -.03 -.16 -.09 -.52** -.23*   
15 Ownership: IJV 0.08 0.28 -.13 -.22* -.06 .01 .13 -.04 -.10 -.26** .02 .05 .09 -.33** -.15 -.15  
16 Revenue growth 0.69 1.23 .10 .09 .24* -.01 -.16 -.13 .11 -.04 .29** -.10 .42** .05 -.10 .06 -.04 
Note: N = 106. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
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Table 3. Regression model for revenue growth 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Control variables        
Firm age (log.) 0.507 0.578 0.881* 0.578 0.879* 0.578 0.879* 
 (0.460) (0.448) (0.442) (0.448) (0.442) (0.448) (0.442) 
Firm size (log.) 0.222 0.082 -0.010 0.082 -0.009 0.082 -0.009 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.206) (0.211) (0.206) (0.211) (0.206) 
Industry: low-tech manuf. 0.809* 0.515 0.399 0.515 0.399 0.515 0.399 
 (0.388) (0.384) (0.372) (0.384) (0.372) (0.384) (0.372) 
Industry: medium- low-tech 
manuf. 
0.418 
(0.463) 
0.249 
(0.449) 
0.375 
(0.438) 
0.249 
(0.449) 
0.374 
(0.438) 
0.249 
(0.449) 
0.374 
(0.438) 
Industry: medium- high-tech 
manuf. 
0.154 
(0.332) 
0.007 
(0.321) 
0.010 
(0.311) 
0.007 
(0.321) 
0.011 
(0.311) 
0.007 
(0.321) 
0.011 
(0.311) 
Industry: services 0.755 
(0.492) 
0.776 
(0.470) 
0.688 
(0.453) 
0.776 
(0.470) 
0.687 
(0.454) 
0.776 
(0.470) 
0.687 
(0.454) 
Public listing -0.239 
(0.279) 
0.057 
(0.315) 
0.165 
(0.307) 
0.057 
(0.315) 
0.165 
(0.307) 
0.057 
(0.315) 
0.165 
(0.307) 
Market growth 0.265* 
(0.103) 
0.140 
(0.105) 
0.169 
(0.102) 
0.140 
(0.105) 
0.169 
(0.102) 
0.140 
(0.105) 
0.168 
(0.102) 
Competitive intensity -0.176 
(0.124) 
-0.121 
(0.121) 
-0.076 
(0.120) 
-0.121 
(0.121) 
-0.076 
(0.120) 
-0.121 
(0.121) 
-0.076 
(0.120) 
        
Ownership: local SOE   
 
 
 
-0.135 
(0.305) 
-0.244 
(0.295) 
-0.428 
(0.429) 
-0.695† 
(0.423) 
Ownership: local private firm  
 
0.135 
(0.305) 
0.244 
(0.294) 
  -0.293 
(0.347) 
-0.451 
(0.339) 
Ownership: WFOE  0.428 
(0.429) 
0.695† 
(0.423) 
0.293 
(0.347) 
0.451 
(0.339) 
  
Ownership: IJV  0.142 
(0.497) 
0.788 
(0.547) 
0.006 
(0.429) 
0.545 
(0.488) 
-0.286 
(0.474) 
0.095 
(0.532) 
Main effects        
Action aggressiveness (H1)  0.486*** 
(0.137) 
-0.087 
(0.259) 
0.486*** 
(0.137) 
0.661*** 
(0.163) 
0.486*** 
(0.137) 
0.920** 
(0.342) 
Interaction effects        
Action aggressiveness*Ownership: 
local SOE 
    -0.747* 
(0.305) 
 -1.006* 
(0.429) 
Action aggressiveness*Ownership: 
local private firm (H2a) 
  0.748* 
(0.305) 
   -0.259 
(0.364) 
Action aggressiveness*Ownership: 
WFOE (H2b) 
  1.007* 
(0.428) 
 0.259 
(0.364) 
  
Action aggressiveness*Ownership: 
IJV (H2c; H2d) 
  -1.120 
(0.922) 
 -1.868* 
(0.899) 
 -2.127* 
(0.932) 
        
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
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Model F 2.385* 2.799** 3.192*** 2.799** 3.191*** 2.799** 3.190*** 
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.182 0.250 0.182 0.250 0.182 0.250 
Note: The entries in the table are unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. 
†p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table 4. Number of firms and descriptive statistics across/of ownership types 
 Local SOE Local private WFOE IJV  
Publicly listed 15 30 0 0 45 
(42.5%) 
Not listed 5 27 20 9 61 
(57.5%) 
Total 20 
(18.9%) 
57 
(53.8%) 
20 
(18.9%) 
9 
(8.5%) 
106 
(100%) 
Firm age (log.) 
(Mean/s.d.) 
1.32 / 0.25 1.24 / 0.28 1.16 / 0.25 1.11 / 0.15  
Firm size (log.) 
(Mean/s.d.) 
3.66 / 0.48 3.37 / 0.71 3.34 / 0.64 2.90 / 0.44  
Note: Observations N = 106. 
 
 
Figure 1. Moderating effect of ownership on the relationship between action aggressiveness 
and revenue growth 
 
Action aggressiveness 
Note: This figure shows the marginal effect of action aggressiveness on revenue growth. 
Action aggressiveness has a range of 1 to 7, mean = 4.86 and SD = 0.91. Hence, about 95% of 
observations fall in the range of mean +/- 2SD, which is 3.04 to 6.68. 
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Chinese private Chinese SOE WFOE JV
R
ev
en
u
e 
g
ro
w
th
 
